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ABSTRACT 
 
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure 
key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide 
unconditional security. This dissertation contains three main studies of the KLJN system.  
The first study presents the refutation of a physical model, proposed by Gunn, 
Allison and Abbott (GAA), to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the 
KLJN secure key distribution. The correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme is 
deduced, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis 
and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA’s experimental 
interpretation is incorrect too.  
The second study analyzes one of the passive (listening) attacks against the 
KLJN system, the cable capacitance attack. In practical situations, due to the non-
idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be 
mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that unconditional 
(information-theoretic) security is preserved. The industrial cable and circuit simulator 
LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in 
KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy 
amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can 
effectively eliminate the leak. 
The third study explores one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current 
injection attack. The LTSPICE is used to emulate the attack against the ideal and a 
 iii 
 
practical KLJN system, respectively. It is shown that two security enhancement 
techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple 
privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information 
leak and successfully preserve the system’s unconditional security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
To my family  
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Laszlo B. Kish, for his guidance 
and great support throughout the course of my research at Texas A&M University.  
Thanks also go to my committee members Dr. Zou, Dr. Li, and Dr. Klappenecker, 
for their advice on my research. I thank my friends and the department faculty and staff 
for making my time at Texas A&M University a great experience. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  ii 
DEDICATION ..........................................................................................................  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................  viii 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................  x 
1. INTRODUCTION  ..............................................................................................  1
  1.1 Data Communication Security .............................................................  1 
  1.2 Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange ................................................  2 
1.2.1   Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) ............................................  3 
1.2.2   The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) Secure 
Key Exchange Scheme ...........................................................  4 
1.3 Brief Literature Review – Attacks and Defense of KLJN Secure 
Key Exchange Scheme .........................................................................  6 
  1.4 Dissertation Focus ................................................................................  7 
2. ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES DO NOT EXIST IN A SHORT CABLE
AT LOW FREQUENCIES .................................................................................  9 
  2.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................  9 
  2.2 GAA’s Claim – Waves Exist in a Finite-Size Cable at  
Arbitrarily Low Frequencies ................................................................  10 
2.3 Refutation of GAA’s Theory and Experimental Interpretation ...........  11 
2.4 Violation of the Wave Equation ...........................................................  12 
2.5 Correct Treatment of Cable Delays in the Frequency Range  
for the KLJN Scheme ...........................................................................  15 
2.5.1   General Considerations .............................................................  15 
2.5.2   Simulation Based on a Circuit Model for the Cable .................  18 
 vii 
 
 
Page 
3. CABLE CAPACITANCE ATTACK AGAINST THE KLJN SECURE  
 KEY EXCHANGE  .............................................................................................  23 
  3.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................  23 
  3.2 Cable Capacitance Attack  ...................................................................  24 
  3.3 Realization of the Cable Capacitance Attack  ......................................  26 
   3.3.1   Generating the Noise .................................................................  26 
   3.3.2   Comparing the Lumped and Distributed Element Models  
  at Different Wavelengths ..........................................................  28 
    3.3.3   The Attack Protocol ..................................................................  31 
   3.3.4   Simulation Results of the Cable Capacitance Attack ................  33 
  3.4 Defense against the Attack ...................................................................  34 
   3.4.1   Capacitor Killer .........................................................................  34 
   3.4.2   Privacy Amplification  ..............................................................  35 
4. CURRENT INJECTION ATTACK AGAINST THE KLJN SECURE 
 KEY EXCHANGE  .............................................................................................  37 
  4.1 Introduction  .........................................................................................  37 
  4.2 Current Injection Attack  ......................................................................  38 
   4.2.1   The Attack Protocol  .................................................................  38 
   4.2.2   Generic Defense Protocol  .........................................................  40 
  4.3 Simulation Results of the Current Injection Attack  ............................  40 
  4.4 Simulation Results of the Defense Methods  .......................................  42 
   4.4.1   The Defense Protocols ..............................................................  42 
   4.4.2   Privacy Amplification  ..............................................................  45 
5. CONCLUSIONS  ................................................................................................  47 
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................  49 
 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1 The two communicators (Alice and Bob) must generate and share 
a joint secure key through the communication channel to encrypt 
and decrypt their messages, while the eavesdropper (Eve) is  
monitoring the related data. . ................................................................     1 
Figure 2      Generic quantum communication arrangement.. .................................  3 
Figure 3 Schematics of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN)  
secure key exchange system. ................................................................     5 
Figure 4      Outline of the pertinent part of the KLJN scheme with a distributed  
LCR model of a long and leakage-free cable. ......................................  13 
Figure 5      Lumped impedance-components-based model of a cable at  
low frequencies for analyzing voltage drop along the cable and  
phase shift in the limit f << fmin. .........................................................  18 
Figure 6      Comparison of simulated data based on impedance models,  
using LTspice, with those of a real (lossy) cable. ................................ . 20   
Figure 7      Cable model and cable capacitive currents. .........................................  25 
Figure 8      The simulated KLJN system with capacitive current cI  . ....................  26 
Figure 9  Statistics of the Johnson noise voltage of LR  with 
610  samples. .........  27 
Figure 10      The RG58 coaxial cable models (1000 m length) with LR  (1 kΩ)  
and HR  (9 kΩ). ....................................................................................  29 
Figure 11      The voltage waveforms at Alice’s side, Ucha,lump and Ucha,dist, for  
the lumped and distributed element models, respectively,  
for a 1000 m cable, at (a) γ  = 0.8; (b) γ  = 8; (c) γ  = 800. ..................  30 
Figure 12    The simulated model with LH bit arrangement ( LR = 1 kΩ  
and HR = 9 kΩ). ....................................................................................  33 
 ix 
 
 
Page 
Figure 13   The KLJN system with the capacitor killer. .........................................  35 
Figure 14    Current injection attack against the ideal KLJN system. .....................  39 
Figure 15    The defense against the current injection attack. .................................  40 
Figure 16   The four different versions of KLJN system under the  
 current injection attack. ........................................................................  41 
Figure 17    Instantaneous voltage and current comparison against  
 current injection attack in the ideal KLJN system. ..............................  43 
Figure 18    The instantaneous voltage and current comparison against  
 current injection attack in practical KLJN system:  
 (a) No current injection attack, (b) Under current injection attack. .....  44 
Figure 19    Demonstration of the efficiency of the defense protocol with  
 the practical cable over the bit exchange period. .................................  45 
 
 x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Page 
Table 1 Simulated equivalent phase velocity calculated from phase shifts  
 between the two ends of the cable versus driving frequency and  
 load resistance (resistance of termination at the other end ). ...............  21 
Table 2 Attack simulation results—Eve’s success probability pE with  
 1000 bits key length. ............................................................................  34 
Table 3 Eve’s success probability pE with 10000 bits key length. ....................  42 
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION* 
 
1.1 Data Communication Security 
 
Security in data communication is an essential part of today's world. When we 
connect and communicate via the Internet, we expect the data communication to be 
secure. Take the example of the software tools we use to sign in to online banking. 
Before a secure data exchange can begin, the two communicators (Alice and Bob) must 
generate and share a joint secret (secure) encryption key through the communication 
channel, while an eavesdropper (Eve) is supposedly monitoring the related data (see 
Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The two communicators (Alice and Bob) must generate and share a joint secure key through the 
communication channel to encrypt and decrypt their messages, while the eavesdropper (Eve) is monitoring 
the related data. Software-based methods are only ‘computationally safe’ and thus potential time bombs 
[11]. 
                                                 
*Part of this section is a modified version of the paper “Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure 
Key Exchange” by H.P. Chen, M. Mohammad, L.B. Kish, which is submitted to the journal Metrology 
and Measurement Systems in Feb 2016 and is pending review. 
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Software-based tools however can only offer computational security (or 
conditional security), which is not a future-proof security. The extraction of the keys is 
limited only by Eve’s computational resources. If Eve had a sufficiently fast computer 
with standard algorithms or a genuinely powerful algorithm, she could extract the secure 
key and decrypt the communicated data with reasonable speed in the future. With 
computing solutions progressing at a high pace, existing software-based secure 
communication is a potential time bomb. 
 
1.2 Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange 
 
Therefore, scientists have been working on physics-based secure key exchange 
schemes which are unconditionally secure. Unconditional security (or information 
theoretic security) means that, even in the case of a perfectly able eavesdropper, the 
perfect security limit (zero information for Eve) of communication can be approached if 
sufficient resources (time, etc.) are available [1].  
It is essential in intelligent vehicle systems [2,3]; for power and sensor networks 
of strategical importance [4,5]; for ultra-strong PUF hardware keys [6]; and in secure 
computer, instrument and video game systems [7]. 
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1.2.1 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 
 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the earliest scheme claimed to be 
unconditionally secure. It was first proposed by Stephen Wiesner in the 1970s, and later 
developed by Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984, and Artur Ekert in 1990 
[45-47]. Single photons are used to carry information bits (see Figure 2). In this scheme, 
the security is based on the ‘no-cloning-theorem’ of quantum physics [48]. The idea is 
that a single photon cannot be copied without noise (error). The photon gets destroyed 
when Eve captures and measures it. She has to re-generate and re-inject it into the 
channel, otherwise Alice and Bob will consider the bit invalid. However, when Eve 
restores the photon, due to the no-cloning rule, noise is introduced. Thus the error rate in 
the channel will be greater than without eavesdropping. Alice and Bob will discover the 
eavesdropping after analyzing a number of transmitted bits and their errors [11].   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Generic quantum communication arrangement. Detecting the eavesdropper requires the statistics 
of bit errors, which calls for a sufficiently large number of bits. The communication of only a few bits is 
not secure [11]. 
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In due course, QKD’s fundamental security claims have been debated by experts 
in the field [49-55]. Furthermore, its practical realizations, including all commercial 
quantum communicators, have been fully cracked. These attacks have been done by 
hacking, that is, by utilizing non-ideal features of the hardware components [56-69]. 
Note, counter-measures (patches) were later proposed to overcome these attacks. 
However, before these patches were invented, the eavesdroppers could have fully 
utilized such attacks [70-73]; which means these systems had not offered any 
unconditional security, at all. The security was only conditional and the condition was 
that Eve avoided these attacks. 
 
1.2.2 The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Scheme 
 
It was a commonly accepted assumption for years that only QKD would be able 
to perform unconditionally secure key exchange. However, this dogma was refuted in 
2005 when Laszlo B. Kish introduced the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure 
key exchange scheme [9], which was subsequently experimentally demonstrated [17].  
The KLJN scheme is the only classical physical competitor of quantum communicators 
[1]. Its security is based on the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem [9] of classical 
statistical physics and the properties of Gaussian stochastic processes [12]. Currently, it 
is also the only unconditionally secure key exchange that can be integrated on a chip and 
has reasonable price [8-11] .  
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The core KLJN secure key exchange system [1,9-11,32-40] is shown in Figure 3, 
while [2-7] and [41-43] are dealing with advanced aspects with expansions and 
applications.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Schematics of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The 
resistor values are LR  and HR . The thermal noise voltages,  LU t  and  HU t , are generated at an 
effective temperature, effT . The channel noise voltage and current are  chU t  and  chI t , respectively 
[13]. 
 
 
 
At the beginning of each bit exchange period (BEP), Alice and Bob, randomly 
select a resistor from the set RL, RH  , RL  RH , where  represents the Low bit value 
(L) and  the High bit value (H), and they connect the chosen resistors to the wire 
channel (cable). The Gaussian voltage noise generators emulates the Johnson noise of 
the resistors and deliver band-limited white noise with publicly agreed bandwidth and 
temperature, Teff .  
LR
HR
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Within each BEP, Alice and Bob measure the current and voltage noises, Ich (t)  
and Uch (t) , in the cable. Using the Johnson formula, they derive the unknown resistance 
value at the other end of the cable which is the difference between their own resistance 
and the total loop resistance [9]. Though Eve can also obtain the total loop resistance, 
she cannot distinguish the LH and HL bit situations, which indicates a secure bit 
exchange. The HH and LL bit situations are disregarded. 
 
1.3 Brief Literature Review - Attacks and Defense of KLJN Secure Key Exchange 
Scheme  
 
There have been various valid attacks causing some information leak but not a 
full crack, such as methods using the cable capacitance [13], cable resistance (Bergou-
Scheuer-Yariv attack) [14-18], temperature-inaccuracy (Hao-attack) [19-21]. However, 
in each case, the information leak can be eliminated whenever sufficient resources 
(either specific hardware, higher accuracy, or enough time for privacy amplification) are 
available, thus the system stays unconditionally secure [1].  
Some other attacks are only unsuccessful attempts with fundamental flaws in 
their model and physics; perhaps the best example the Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) 
"directional coupler" attack [22], where conceptual and theoretical flaws [23-25] suggest 
that a directional coupler can be built and that will serve with information leak. However, 
directional coupler cannot be built for the KLJN's no-wave (quasi static) situation. 
Moreover, it could not cause information leak even if existed [23-25]. Most interestingly 
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are the experimental errors in [22], (see them rebutted in [26]), which seemingly support 
the unjustified expectations.  
Another one, a high-profile many-sided cracking attempt by Bennett-Riedel [27] 
has also failed with all of its goals, see [28], further indicating that physical security is a 
subtle topic. We also mention an earlier unsuccessful attempt [29], which, similarly to 
the above ones, triggered discussions [30] with valuable outcomes. Finally, we mention 
a recent transient attack by GAA [31], which is valid even though there are serious flaws 
both in the security and physics aspect of the paper, and a simple solution does exist [32] 
to fully eliminate this attack, too.  
In conclusion, the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme remains 
unchallenged. As with the evolution of quantum communicators, further attacks schemes 
are expected to emerge and to trigger new defense solutions that nullify those attacks, 
too.  
 
1.4 Dissertation Focus 
 
This dissertation focuses primarily on the attacks and defense of the practical 
KLJN secure key exchange scheme.  
The first study is regarding a physical model proposed by Gunn, Allison and 
Abbott (GAA) [22] who proposed a new, delay-based attack against the KLJN secure 
key exchange scheme [1,28,33,44] in 2014. In the study, this model is refuted and 
subsequently a correct mathematical model of the scheme based on impedances at the 
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quasi-static limit is deduced. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our 
approach and prove that GAA’s experimental interpretation is incorrect too.  
The second study analyzes one of the passive (listening) attacks against the 
KLJN system, the cable capacitance attack. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in 
practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small 
information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so 
that unconditional (information-theoretic) security is preserved. In the study, the 
industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak 
due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation 
results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) 
arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak. 
The third study explores one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current 
injection attack. The LTSPICE is used to emulate the attack against the ideal and a 
practical KLJN system, respectively. It is shown that two security enhancement 
techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple 
privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information 
leak and successfully preserve the system’s unconditional security.  
Conclusion is presented at the end to summarize the key points drawn from the 
studies.  
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2. ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES DO NOT EXIST IN A SHORT CABLE AT 
LOW FREQUENCIES* 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The study in this section is also included in the paper “Do Electromagnetic 
Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? What does Physics Say?” [23]. The 
paper was accepted and published by the journal Fluctuation and Noise Letters in 2014.  
In 2014, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [22] proposed a physical model to 
utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the KLJN secure key distribution 
[1,28,33,44]. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be 
fundamentally flawed [23] because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates 
the wave equation.  
First we provide an overview of GAA’s claim, followed by our refutation of their 
proposed physical model and their experimental interpretations. After that we present a 
correct mathematical model of the scheme. Then, simulation results are shown which 
can also confirm our approach and prove that GAA’s experimental explanation is 
incorrect.  
 
                                                 
*Reprinted with permission from “Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? 
What does Physics Say?” by H.P. Chen, L.B. Kish, C.G. Granqvist, G. Schmera, 2014. Fluctuation and 
Noise Letters, 13, 1450016, © [2014] by World Scientific Publishing Company.  
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2.2 GAA’s Claim – Waves Exist in a Finite-Size Cable at Arbitrarily Low 
Frequencies 
 
A new, delay-based attack against the KLJN secure key distribution scheme 
[1,28,33,44] is proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [22] in 2014. GAA 
claim—contradicting earlier statements most recently expounded in work by Kish, 
Abbott and Granqvist (KAG) [28]—that waves exist in a finite-size cable at arbitrarily 
low frequencies.  
The theoretical basis of GAA’s assertion [22] is the fact that, whereas wave-
guides usually have a low-frequency cut-off for wave modes versus the diameter of the 
wave-guide, no such cut-off exists for transversal electromagnetic (TEM) wave modes in 
the case of infinitely long wave-guides. GAA write that, because coaxial cables have 
TEM wave modes, there is no frequency cut-off of the wave-based component of the 
electrical transport down to zero frequency. As a consequence of their presumption, 
GAA use the d’Alembert solution [22] 
 
+ -( , ) = - + -
x xU t x U t U t
v v
                                                         (1) 
 
for propagating lossless fluctuations—which may or may not be waves—in a linear 
medium to model the propagation of voltage in the cable used for key exchange in the 
KLJN scheme, where U+ and U– are voltage components of waves propagating to the 
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right and left along the x axis, and v is propagation velocity. 
The experimental support of GAA’s claim is that they have measured the voltage 
between the ends of a short coaxial cable at low-frequency sinusoidal voltage drive with 
an impedance-matched load at the other end and, at first sight, have found that their 
results confirmed some of the implications of Eq. 1, as further elaborated in Section 2.5 
below. 
We have analyzed GAA’s statements [22] and found most of them invalid. 
Specifically, our findings and conclusions are the following:  
(i) In cables, wave modes with wavelengths greater than twice their length are 
forbidden states, meaning that such modes do not exist; consequently there are no waves 
in cables in the frequency range pertinent to the KLJN scheme. 
(ii) Instead, time-dependent propagation processes are non-wave type retarded 
potentials in a distributed impedance system; one of the implications of this is that Eq. 1 
does not hold. 
(iii) GAA’s interpretation of their own “wave-verification” experiments [22] is 
invalid. 
 
2.3 Refutation of GAA’s Theory and Experimental Interpretation 
 
As mentioned above, GAA’s attack [22] on the KLJN scheme employs waves 
and related delays in a cable to extract information. While attempts to utilize time delays 
in cables for information purposes are to be encouraged, the asserted use of waves, 
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which do not exist, is a fundamental flaw that invalidates GAA’s basic considerations, 
proposed experiments, and interpretation of these experiments. 
The wavelengths corresponding to the frequency range of concern in the KLJN 
scheme are much longer than the physical extent of the cable, and we earlier referred to 
that range the “no-wave” or “quasi-static” limit [1,28,33,44]. As remarked above, GAA 
argue that TEM wave modes do not exhibit any low-frequency cut-off. It is true that 
TEM wave modes in a wave-guide do not have a low-frequency cut-off versus the 
diameter of the wave-guide, but this argument is irrelevant because wave modes do have 
a cut-off versus the length of the cable. This does not imply that the electrical transport 
itself has a cut-off; it solely means that, when wave modes are forbidden, electrical 
transport takes place via non-wave phenomena—such as drift and relaxation—which 
constitute the form of transport in the quasi-static region of electrodynamics. 
In this section, we use physics and mathematics to prove that GAA’s assumption 
of the existence of waves in the short cable within the frequency range pertinent to the 
KLJN scheme violates the wave equation (our proof is given subsequently).  
 
2.4 Violation of the Wave Equation 
 
It was recently pointed out by KAG [28] (including one of the proponents of the 
GAA model) that the wave equation precludes the existence of waves in the frequency 
range of concern for the KLNJ scheme. Next we provide more details about this fact and 
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first illustrate the distributed inductance–capacitance–resistance (LCR) model of the 
cable in the KLJN scheme in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Outline of the pertinent part of the KLJN scheme with a distributed LCR model of a long and 
leakage-free cable. When the cable losses can be neglected, one may omit the Ri resistors representing the 
distributed resistance of the cable. Alice’s and Bob’s resistors, denoted RA and RB, respectively, are 
randomly selected from the set  L H,R R with L H( )R R at the beginning of each bit-exchange period. 
These resistors, with associated serial generators (not shown), emulate thermal noise with high noise 
temperature and strongly limited bandwidth. 
 
 
 
For the sake of simplicity but without restricting generality, we discuss the case 
of a lossless cable. The main conclusion about the lack of wave modes is general 
because the inclusion of damping terms in harmonic differential equations can never 
produce new eigen-frequencies; they can only modify them and their bandwidth.  
The wave equations of voltage ( , )U x t  and current ( , )I x t  in lossless cables are 
 
2 2
2 2 2
c
( , ) 1 ( , )U x t U x t
x v t
   ,                                          (2) 
 
2 2
2 2 2
c
( , ) 1 ( , )I x t I x t
x v t
    ,                                                       (3) 
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where the phase propagation velocity of waves in the cable is 
 
c
u u
1v
L C
  .                                                 (4) 
 
Here uL  and uC  are inductance and capacitance “densities” of the cable (with 
units of H/m and F/m), i.e., the unit-length (one-meter) cable inductance and capacitance.  
The general classical-physical solutions of these equations in infinite ideal cables 
are superpositions of waves, with arbitrary frequency, propagating in positive and 
negative directions in accordance with the d’Alembert solution in Eq. 1. However, in a 
cable with finite length D, the frequency-space of solutions is quantized to discrete 
values so that integer multiples of the half-wavelength fit in the cable. Thus the 
wavelength maxλ  of the wave with the lowest frequency minf  can be written as 
 
c
max min2   ,    2
vλ D f
D
     .                                    (5) 
 
Frequencies below fmin, down to zero frequency, constitute a forbidden band of 
wave states.  
The KLJN key exchanger operation strictly requires for security that its 
frequency range satisfies the quasi-static condition, i.e., 
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minf f  .                                       (6) 
 
Thus the wave-based scheme and considerations of GAA for eavesdropping 
violate not only the wave equations in Eqs. 2 and 3, and its d’Alembert solution in Eq. 1, 
but also the related other fields of classical and quantum physics of waves, because such 
non-existent solutions are forbidden states. 
We note, in passing, that if the wave-based treatment by GAA [22] were correct, 
we would not have quantization of atomic electron shells, a forbidden band (energy gap) 
would not exist in solid state physics, semiconductor devices would not work, and even 
chemistry would be non-existent or at least very different. 
 
2.5 Correct Treatment of Cable Delays in the Frequency Range for the KLJN 
Scheme  
 
2.5.1 General Considerations 
 
We showed above that wave modes cannot exist in the cable at the KLJN 
condition f << fmin. A number of questions then arise naturally, such as (i) what type of 
system is the cable under these conditions, (ii) what is the nature of the propagating 
fluctuations caused by Alice’s and Bob’s noise generators, and (iii) are there any other 
implications of the KLJN condition? 
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To answer these questions, we first note that the system under consideration is 
not a waveguide, as implied by GAA [22], but a distributed impedance network in the 
quasi-static limit. Secondly, the propagating fluctuations are not waves but phase-shifted 
voltages and currents; in the language of physics they are related to retarded potentials 
of non-wave solutions, and in electrical engineering vocabulary they are spatio-temporal 
fluctuations in an impedance network. 
The general implications of the KLJN conditions are very pervasive, as 
elaborated and discussed in Section 2.3 & 2.4 above. The specific consequences for the 
KLJN scheme are that the mathematical and physical framework used by GAA [22] is 
invalid and that the same applies to their experimental analysis. 
When the frequency converges towards zero, the impact of the inductance and 
capacitance of the cable on the cable current and voltage also rapidly diminish. However, 
the voltage drop over the cable is determined by its serial resistance Rc and inductance Lc, 
because the capacitive shunt currents approach zero. Thus the first-order approximation 
of the cable impedance is 
 
c c c2Z R j fL   .                                    (7) 
 
For simplicity, we analyze the situation wherein the cable loss (resistance) is negligible 
so that 
 
c c2Z j fL .                                     (8) 
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The corresponding phase delay of the voltage at Bob’s end, compared to that of Alice’s 
end, is 
 
AB c B2 /fL R                                         (9) 
 
when the voltage is generated by Alice. This phase delay corresponds to a frequency-
independent time delay according to 
 
AB c B/L R    ,                                                (10) 
 
which at first glance seems to suggest that we are dealing with waves and that the 
d’Alembert equation holds, as stated by GAA. However one must realize that this time 
delay depends on the load resistance RB at the other end of the cable, which implies that 
the time delay and measured phase velocity in the two directions are different due to the 
condition A BR R  during secure bit exchange [1,28,33,44], i.e., under circumstances 
such that GAA’s method [22] is supposed to function. To illustrate this dichotomy, we 
evaluate the phase delay for voltage propagation in the opposite direction, i.e., when the 
voltage is generated by Bob. Now one finds  
 
BA c A2 /fL R                                                   (11) 
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Figure 6 shows results of our simulation addressing the experimental data in 
GAA’s article [22]. The conditions are the same as those of GAA [22] and reported in 
their Figure 5, but our simulation uses a practical cable model and simple impedance 
representations (see Figure 5), which fit the cable data to a high degree of accuracy. The 
practical lossy cable and the simple impedance model in Figure 5a give identical results, 
while results for the lossless cable (corresponding to data compensated for loss in 
GAA’s work [22]) are nicely represented by the simple inductance model in Figure 5b.  
Moreover, it is obvious that the cable inductance Lc produces a voltage drop that 
is the time-derivative of the current, which is determined predominantly by the 
resistances in the loop. Thus the voltage drop for the lossless cable is the time derivative 
of Alice’s generator voltage, and this experimental finding by GAA [22] to “support” the 
d’Alembert equation is simply an inductor-type voltage response and it has nothing to do 
with waves. 
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Figure 6 Comparison of simulated data based on impedance models, using LTspice, with those of a real 
(lossy) cable. Alice’s and Bob’s resistors, denoted RA and RB, have the resistance RW, and Alice drives the 
cable with a sinusoidal voltage generator (1 V) via Bob’s resistor. The cable is characterized by length D = 
1.5 m, Lc = 1.03 μH, Rc = 0.0315 Ω, and Cc = 150 pF. The upper panel shows voltage drop UAB over the 
cable between Alice’s and Bob’s ends and the lower panel shows phase shift of UAB compared to that of 
the voltage at Alice’s end. Squares signify simulations of a lossy cable (model RG58), crosses represent 
data obtained by the use of the lumped-parameters-model in Figure 5a, and the solid line was derived from 
an inductance model devised to simulate a lossless cable (Figure 5b). These results are in full agreement 
with the experimental data shown in Figure 5 of GAA’s work [22]. 
 
 
 
 21 
 
To subject Eqs. 10 and 11 to a final test, we evaluated the phase delay and 
corresponding time delay toward Bob when the resistor at Bob’s end was varied and the 
cable was lossless. Data are shown in Table 1 and verify the correctness of our Eq. 10 to 
an accuracy of five digits. GAA’s “propagation velocity” toward Bob is practically 
independent of frequency but depends on Bob’s resistor. During secure bit exchange, the 
"propagation" times toward Alice and Bob are different. This fact verifies our conclusion 
that GAA’s use of the d’Alembert equation, as the base of their mathematical 
considerations, is indeed incorrect. 
 
 
 
Table 1 The simulated equivalent phase velocity calculated from phase shifts between the two ends of the 
cable versus driving frequency and load resistance (the resistance of termination at the other end). The 
dependence on the resistance is in violation of the d’Alembert equation; for example, in the KLJN system 
during secure key exchange where the terminal resistances are different. Cable parameters are given in the 
caption for Figure 6. 
 1 kHz 5 kHz 
10 Ω 3.99998 x 107 m/s 4.00018 x 107 m/s 
20 Ω 7.99996 x 107 m/s 8.00038 x 107 m/s 
50 Ω 1.99999 x 108 m/s 2.00007 x 108 m/s 
1 kΩ 3.99993 x 109 m/s 4.00011 x 109 m/s 
10 kΩ 3.99946 x 1010 m/s 4.00041 x 1010 m/s 
 
 
 
One should observe that, for the cases of 1 kΩ and 10 kΩ, GAA’s “phase 
velocity” is greater than the speed of light. This is acceptable and happens often with the 
phase velocity of oscillations in a driven impedance system in the steady-state; however, 
it is prohibited in the d’Alembert equation as a consequence of the theory of special 
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relativity. Similar effects can happen in wave-based systems with reflecting boundary 
conditions in stationary mode after the waves fill the system; however, in wave-based 
systems the phase velocity would be the same for the left and right directions.  
In conclusion, the proper KLJN scheme is a simple impedance circuitry with 
related phase shifts where the corresponding time shifts are asymmetrical during secure 
bit exchange.  
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3. CABLE CAPACITANCE ATTACK AGAINST THE KLJN SECURE KEY 
EXCHANGE*  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The research in this section is from the paper “Cable Capacitance Attack Against 
The KLJN Secure Key Exchange” [13], which was submitted to the journal Information 
and was published in 2015.  
In the practical KLJN system, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, 
there is a small information leak. One of such non-idealities is the parasitic cable 
capacitance of which Eve can exploit to attack the KLJN system. We call it cable 
capacitance attack. It is a kind of passive (listening) attack, and is also one of the most 
effective attacks against the practical KLJN system. This attack is first mentioned in 
2006 [16], but has never been tested. Subsequently in 2008, a solution was suggested to 
eliminate this attack by adding a capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) 
arrangement [17]. 
In this section, we first present the attack protocol. This is then followed by the 
simulation of the attack against the practical KLJN system using the industrial cable and 
circuit simulator LTSPICE by Liner Technology. The information leak and an 
eavesdropper’s success probability in guessing the exchanged key bits are evaluated.  
                                                 
*Reprinted with permission from “Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange” by 
H.P. Chen, E. Gonzalez, Y. Saez, L.B. Kish, 2015. Information, 6, 719-732, © [2015] by Chen, Gonzalez, 
Saez and Kish. 
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Solutions to mitigate this attack, such as the capacitor killer arrangement [17] and 
privacy amplification [43], are also tested and explained with the simulation results. 
 
3.2 Cable Capacitance Attack 
 
We use coaxial cables because, in this case, the cable capacitance attack [16] can 
effectively be eliminated without the usage of privacy amplification. However, the attack 
works with any cable. Coaxial cables include two conductors: the inner wire, which is 
used as the KLJN channel, and the outer shield, which is grounded (for the ground, see 
also Figure 7). There is a non-zero capacitance between these two conductors that leads 
to capacitive currents. Part of the channel noise current is diverted by the parasitic 
capacitance, which causes a greater current at the end of the lower resistance. This gives 
Eve a chance to guess the value of the resistors with probability of success greater than 
0.5. 
Figure 7 shows the distributed elements model of coaxial cables. According to 
Kirchhoff’s current law, at position x , the channel noise current  xI t  is the sum of the 
capacitive current  c,xI t  through the parasitic capacitor element xC , and the channel 
noise current  x+1I t . This is written as 
 
     x c,x x+1I t I t I t  .                                                                                                 (13) 
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The capacitive current  c,xI t  is proportional to the time derivative of the channel noise 
voltage  xU t  and it is given by 
 
   xc,x x dU tI t C dt  .                                                                                                      (14) 
 
We define the cross-correlation ( )ρ x  [28] at position x  as the product of the 
channel noise current and the time derivative of the channel noise voltage: 
 
     xx dU tx I t dt    ,                                                                                             (15) 
 
where   means finite time ( ) average. The location-dependence of ( )ρ x  represents 
the information leak [28]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Cable model and cable capacitive currents. 
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3.3 Realization of the Cable Capacitance Attack 
 
The LTSPICE was used to emulate the practical KLJN system with the RG58 
coaxial cable from its library. Throughout the simulations, we assumed that Alice 
selected LR  = 1 kΩ and Bob HR  = 9 kΩ; see Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 The simulated KLJN system with capacitive current cI . The generator voltages, th,LU  and th,HU , 
are the Johnson noise voltages of LR  and HR , respectively. 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Generating the Noise 
 
For the simulations, we generated Gaussian band-limited white noises. 
According to Johnson’s noise formula, the required rms noise voltage thU  is 
 
th eff noise4U kT RB .                                                                                                      (16) 
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As the mean value is zero, the rms noise voltages are the same as their standard 
deviations (denoted as L  and H  for th,LU  and th,HU , respectively). Thus 
 
th,L th,H L H L H  U U R R ,                                                                                    (17) 
 
where L H 1/ 9R R , thus  L  H  1/ 3. For the simulations, the rms thermal noise 
voltages of LR  and HR  were chosen as 1 V and 3 V, respectively, corresponding to 
16
eff 7 10  K T . 
Figure 9a shows the probability density function (histogram) of the noise voltage 
of LR . In Figure 9b the cumulative distribution as normal probability plot can be seen 
where a straight line indicates exact normal distribution. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Statistics of the Johnson noise voltage of LR  with 
610  samples. (a) Probability density function 
(histogram); (b) Cumulative distribution as normal probability plot. 
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3.3.2 Comparing the Lumped and Distributed Element Models at Different 
Wavelengths 
 
First, for enhanced computational speed, we explored the possibility of using a 
lumped element cable model for the simulations because the continuum model 
simulations are at least 1000 times slower. Our data below proves that lumped elements 
can be used for high-accuracy simulations at the operational conditions of KLJN. 
The quasi-static condition is required for the security of the KLJN system [9,28]. 
That means 
 
c noiseD v B   or 1D   ,                                                                               (18) 
 
where D  is the cable length,   is the shortest wavelength at the highest frequency 
component of the noise bandwidth noiseB , cv  is the propagation velocity in the cable, and   
is the ratio of the wavelength to the cable length. It has been assumed that   must be at least 
around 10 to fulfill the KLJN conditions [23-26,28] (i.e., approximate quasi-static 
electrodynamics; see [23,24] concerning the proof that there are no waves in this limit). 
Figure 10a and 10b show the simple lumped element model and the distributed 
model of the RG58 coaxial cable. Based on the specific inductance and capacitance, the 
propagation velocity cv  in the RG58 coaxial cable is 
82 10  m/s. Three simulations were 
run to compare the resultant voltage waveforms at Alice’s side, at three different noise 
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bandwidths noiseB  (250 kHz, 25 kHz, 0.25 kHz) on these 2 models. The cable length was 
set at 1000 m, and based on Eq. 18, the three corresponding wavelengths ( )  were 800 
m, 8 km, and 800 km, while the corresponding   ratios were 0.8, 8 and 800. Other 
parameters such as the component values of the models used in the simulations are also 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 The RG58 coaxial cable models (1000 m length) with LR  (1 kΩ) and HR  (9 kΩ). The lumped 
element model: component values s 10.5R   , s 125 μHL  , p 100 nFC  . The distributed model had the 
following parameters: 0.021 mR   , 250 nH mL  , 100 pF mC  . The characteristic impedance of the 
cable is 50 Ω. 
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situations     8, the lumped element simulations are satisfactory. Both cases are fine for 
the KLJN operation and we will use the 800   condition in the rest of the paper. 
For our resistor values LR  = 1 kΩ and HR  = 9 kΩ, the cut-off frequency by the 
cable capacitance is 1.76 kHz and 17.6 kHz for a 1000 m and a 100 m cable, 
respectively. To avoid having the cable capacitance truncate the effective bandwidth of 
the noise, we used noise bandwidth noise 0.25 kHzB   for the noise generators ( 800   
at 1000 m and 8000   at 100 m). 
 
3.3.3 The Attack Protocol 
 
In this section, we discuss the information leak caused by the cable capacitance 
and evaluate Eve’s success probability in terms of guessing the key bits. The fixed bit 
arrangement is used between Alice and Bob. 
During the exchange of the i-th bit, Eve measures the cross-correlations: 
 
   chaa chai dU tρ I t dt    ,                                                                                             (19) 
 
   chbb chbi dU tρ I t dt    ,                                                                                            (20) 
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where  chaU t ,  chaI t ,  chbU t  and  chbI t  are the channel voltages and currents at 
Alice’s and Bob’s ends, respectively, see Figure 12. The time average   is taken over 
the bit exchange period  . Eve calculates a b=i i iρ ρ - ρ  ( 1,..., )i N  and decides as 
follows: 
 
If     0    then  1    ( ).
If     0    then  0   ( ).
i i
i i
ρ q Eve guessed the bit correctly
ρ q Eve guessed the bit wrongly
 
                                         (21) 
 
When N approaches infinity, the probability of Eve’s successful guessing of the 
bits is equal to the expected value of q  and 
 
E 0.5i Nq p ε   , where 0 0.5ε  ,                                                                        (22) 
 
where non-zero ε  represents an information leak. When 0ε  , the KLJN key exchange 
system is perfectly secure. We found that the higher the difference between the 
resistances, the higher the bandwidth, or the higher the parasitic capacitance (the longer 
the cable), the greater the leak. 
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Figure 12 The simulated model with LH bit arrangement ( LR  = 1 kΩ and HR  = 9 kΩ).  chaU t ,  chaI t , 
 chbU t  and  chbI t  are the voltages and currents at Alice’s and Bob’s ends, respectively. 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Simulation Results of the Cable Capacitance Attack 
 
We simulated 6 different attack scenarios with these parameters: LR  = 1 kΩ, HR  
= 9 kΩ, noise bandwidth noiseB  = 0.25 kHz, sampling period st  = 1 msec, for 3 different 
single-bit exchange durations (measured by the unit of the autocorrelation time of the 
noise), 20, 50, and 100; at 2 different cable lengths, 100 and 1000 m. At each scenario, 
the key was 1000 bits long. 
The simulation results are shown in Table 2. At bit exchange duration = 20 (50 
bits per second), with a 100 m cable, Eve’s success probability was 0.509. However, 
when the cable length was increased to 1000 m with the other parameters unchanged, 
Eve’s success probability increased to 0.622. 
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Table 2 Attack simulation results—Eve’s success probability, Ep , with 1000 bits key length. 
Bit Exchange Duration Bits Per Second 100 m Cable 1000 m Cable 
20 50 0.509 0.622 
50 20 0.521 0.697 
100 10 0.526 0.769 
 
 
 
When the bit exchange duration was increased to 50 and 100, Eve’s success 
probability increased accordingly as shown in Table 2. In the most effective attack case, 
Eve success probability was 0.769. 
 
3.4 Defense against the Attack 
 
3.4.1 Capacitor Killer 
 
The parasitic capacitance of the RG58 coaxial cable can be eliminated by the 
well-known capacitance compensation technique, called capacitor killer arrangement 
[17], providing the same voltage on the outer shield of the cable as on the inner wire. This 
can be done by an ideal voltage follower, see Figure 13. There is no capacitive current 
from the inner wire to the outer shield, so the attack is nullified. 
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Figure 13 The KLJN system with the capacitor killer. An ideal voltage follower is driving the outer shield, 
which is not grounded at this time. 
 
 
 
We simulated the capacitor killer arrangement in the most effective attack 
scenario (i.e., when Eve success probability was 0.769). The simulation results showed 
that Eve’s success probability was reduced from 0.769 to 0.501. This indicated that the 
capacitor killer is very effective in eliminating the leak due to the parasitic capacitance 
under the practical cable conditions we tested. 
 
3.4.2 Privacy Amplification 
 
Another method to secure the key exchange and to reduce information leak is by 
utilizing privacy amplification [43]. Due to the extraordinarily low bit error probability 
of the KLJN system [38-40], privacy amplification (which is basically an error enhancer) 
can be used to effectively reduce any information leak. The simplest and most secure 
concept [43] is that Alice and Bob XOR the subsequent pairs of the key bits (i.e., XOR 
the first and the second bits to get the first bit of the new key, XOR the third and the 
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fourth bits to get the next one, etc.). In this way, the length of the new key will be half of 
the original one but Eve’s success probability will get closer to 0.5; that is, it moves 
toward the limit of zero information. We simulated the effect of this technique by utilizing 
the most effective attack scenario (see Table 2). The simulation results showed that by 
XOR-ing once, Eve’s success probability was reduced from 0.769 to 0.642, which was 
further reduced to 0.544 by XOR-ing a second time to produce a cleaner key with the 
corresponding significantly higher security and one quarter of its original length. 
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4. CURRENT INJECTION ATTACK AGAINST THE KLJN SECURE KEY 
EXCHANGE* 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The research in this section is from the paper “Current Injection Attack Against 
The KLJN Secure Key Exchange”, which is submitted to the journal Metrology and 
Measurement Systems and is pending review in 2016.   
The current injection attack is an active (invasive) attack, which was introduced 
in 2006 [9]. Its security analysis was given in 2013 [28], but the attack itself had never 
been practically tested.  
In this section, the attack protocol is proposed. LTSPICE industrial cable and 
circuit simulator is used to emulate the current injection attack, against the ideal and a 
practical KLJN system, respectively. The information leak and an eavesdropper’s 
success probability in guessing the exchanged key bits are evaluated. This is followed by 
the explanation of the defense protocols which can fight against the attacks to eliminate 
or mitigate the information leak, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison 
method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme. The defense protocols are also 
tested and simulation results shown. 
 
 
                                                 
*Part of this section is a modified version of the paper “Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure 
Key Exchange” by H.P. Chen, M. Mohammad, L.B. Kish, which is submitted to the journal Metrology 
and Measurement Systems in Feb 2016 and is pending review. 
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4.2 Current Injection Attack  
 
4.2.1 The Attack Protocol 
 
For the sake of simplicity but without restricting generality, fixed LH bit 
arrangement with RL  RH  is assumed. During the exchange of the bit, Eve attempts to 
identify the location of  and  by injecting a Gaussian current Iinj t  of the same 
bandwidth as the channel noises into the cable while she measures the following cross-
correlations during the exchange of the i-th key bit: 
 
ia  Iinj t  Icha t    ,                                                                                                    (23) 
 
ib  I inj t  Ichb t    ,                                                                                                    (24) 
 
where  and  are the channel currents at Alice’s and Bob’s ends, 
respectively, see Figure 14. The time average   is taken over the bit exchange period 
 . According to the current divider rule, a greater current flows to the direction of the 
lower resistance. With Alice connecting to and Bob connecting to , the cross-
correlation ia  at Alice’s side is greater than the cross-correlation ib  at Bob’s side. For 
N bits, Eve calculates i  ia  ib   (i  1,..., N )   and decides as follows: 
LR HR
 chaI t  chbI t
LR HR
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If   i  0    then  LH   (Eve guessed the bit correctly),  set  qi  1 .                            (25) 
 
If   i  0    then  HL   (Eve guessed the bit incorrectly),  set  qi  0 .                         (26) 
 
When  approaches infinity, the probability pE  of Eve’s successful guessing of 
the bits converges to the expected value of  and 
 
qi N  pE where .                                                                                      (27) 
 
The case , indicates perfect security, that is, Eve’s information is zero 
(equivalent to guessing the key bits by tossing an unbiased random coin [43]).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Current injection attack against the ideal KLJN system [9].  injI t  is the injection current. 
 chaI t ,  chbI t ,  chaU t  and  chbU t  are the channel currents/voltages at Alice’s and Bob’s ends, 
respectively. (Note, the positive current directions at the two ends are chosen to follow the directions of 
the components of Eve's injected positive current). 
N
q
E0.5 1p 
E 0.5p 
 40 
 
4.2.2 Generic Defense Protocol 
 
To provide security against the current injection attack, Alice and Bob can act 
similarly against any active (invasive) attacks by measuring the instantaneous voltage 
and current amplitudes at their ends and compare them via public authenticated data 
exchange [1,10], see Figure 15. In the case of deviance, Alice and Bob discard the bit or 
use a more advanced security protocol [1].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 The defense against the current injection attack. 
 
 
 
4.3 Simulation Results of the Current Injection Attack 
 
We used the RG58 coaxial cable model from the library of the cable and circuit 
simulator LTSPICE (Linear Technology), to test both the ideal and a practical KLJN 
system. We assumed that Alice and Bob selected  and , L 1 kR   H 9 kR  
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respectively; the bit exchange period   was 0.1 s; N=10000; ; and the 
bandwidth of the Gaussian noises 250 Hz. 
We tested three levels of the injected Gaussian current noise, i.e., 0.1%, 1% and 
10% of the rms channel current, in four different versions of the KLJN system (see 
Figure 16). At each scenario, Eve’s probability of guessing the bits was calculated, see 
Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 The four different versions of the KLJN system under the current injection attack. (a) the ideal 
KLJN system; (b) the practical KLJN system with 100 m cable; (c) the practical KLJN system with 1000 
m cable; (d) the practical KLJN system with 1000 m cable and capacitor killer (ideal unity-gain voltage 
buffer) [13]. cI  is the capacitive current from the inner conductor to the outer shield of the cable. The 
cable is the RG58 coaxial cable. 
 
16
eff 7.25 10 KT  
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At 0.1% injected current level, in the ideal KLJN system, pE  was 0.503, which is 
near to ideal. At 1% and 10% the information leak progressively increased with higher 
pE  values (0.513 and 0.613). Eve’s success probability values in the practical cable-
based systems were very similar, see Table 3. Injecting even higher levels of current is 
also possible but that makes the detection of eavesdropping easier.  
 
 
 
Table 3 Eve’s success probability, Ep , with 10000 bits key length.  
Injection current 
(in % of the rms channel current) 
0.1% 1% 10% 
Ideal cable 0.503 0.513 0.613 
100 meters cable 0.503 0.513 0.613 
1000 meters cable 0.501 0.510 0.608 
1000 meters cable with capacitor killer 0.503 0.513 0.613 
 
 
 
4.4 Simulation Results of the Defense Methods 
 
4.4.1 The Defense Protocols 
 
As mentioned above, in the ideal KLJN system, Alice and Bob can easily 
discover the current injection attack by comparing the instantaneous current data [9]. If 
the currents are different, Alice and Bob can discard the bit.  
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Figure 17 Instantaneous voltage and current comparison against the current injection attack in the ideal 
KLJN system. (a) No attack. (b) Under current injection attack. 
 
 
 
However, in practical systems, the currents are slightly different due to the 
cable's capacitive current leak. Then Alice and Bob must also monitor and exchange the 
instantaneous voltage data, too. Then, they input the voltage data into the accurate cable 
model and compare the simulated currents  and  with the corresponding 
measured currents  chaI t  and Ichb t  , see Figure 18.  
 
 
 
 
 *chaI t  *chbI t
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Figure 18 The instantaneous voltage and current comparison against the current injection attack in the 
practical KLJN system: (a) No current injection attack, (b) Under current injection attack.  *chaI t  and 
 *chbI t  are the simulated currents at Alice’s and Bob’s side, respectively.  cI t  is the leakage current 
through the cable parasitic capacitance.  
 
 
 
If the measured and the simulated currents are the same,  
 
,                                                                                                        (28) 
 
,                                                                                                       (29) 
 
then the bit exchange is secure. If the currents are different, an attack may take place. If 
the difference is greater than a pre-agreed threshold value, Alice and Bob discard the bit. 
   *cha cha 0I t I t 
   *chb chb 0I t I t 
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The simulated comparison results at Alice’s side are shown in Figure 19. The 
solid line indicates a current injection attack and the  chaI t -  *chaI t  difference is well 
visible. Alice and Bob can recognize the attack virtually immediately. The dashed line 
shows the secure situation with  chaI t =  *chaI t . 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Demonstration of the efficiency of the defense protocol with the practical cable over the bit 
exchange period. Alice and Bob can recognize the attack virtually immediately. The cable length is 1000 
m. 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Privacy Amplification 
 
Privacy amplification is a well-known method that can be used to reduce any 
type of information leak [43]. The KLJN system can reach extraordinarily low bit error 
probability [38-40]. Thus privacy amplification (which is basically an error enhancer) 
can be efficiently be used. The simplest technique is the XOR-ing of the subsequent 
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pairs of the key bits, that is, generating a new key which is cleaner and have half of the 
length of the original key. We simulated the effect of this technique at the most effective 
attack scenario, see Table 1. The simulation results showed that by XOR-ing once, Eve’s 
success probability was reduced from 0.613 to 0.530, which was further reduced to 
0.502 by XOR-ing the second time. The resulting key length became one quarter of its 
original length with significantly higher security.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS*
This section summarizes the main points and the results presented in this 
dissertation.   
In Section 2, the efforts of GAA [22] to utilize time delays in cables to crack the 
KLJN scheme represent an interesting and novel approach and, as such, deserve 
attention. However, it should be mentioned that Liu [29] previously used a similar 
technique, but with unphysical conditions for the simulations [30]. As shown in 
considerable detail above, GAA’s efforts can be irrevocably refuted. It is essential that 
any attempt to crack the KLJN scheme should be founded on correct physical models.  
In Section 3, we have validated the cable capacitance attack by utilizing the 
LTSPICE simulator. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor 
killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak. In the 
most effective attack scenario, the capacitor killer arrangement can be used to bring 
down the eavesdropper’s success probability of guessing the bit from 0.769 to 0.501, 
meaning the eavesdropper has negligible information about the key.  
*Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable
at Low Frequencies? What does Physics Say?” by H.P. Chen, L.B. Kish, C.G. Granqvist, G. Schmera, 
2014. Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 13, 1450016, © [2014] by World Scientific Publishing Company.  
*Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure
Key Exchange” by H.P. Chen, E. Gonzalez, Y. Saez, L.B. Kish, 2015. Information, 6, 719-732,  © [2015] 
by Chen, Gonzalez, Saez and Kish. 
*Part of this section is a modified version of the paper “Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure
Key Exchange” by H.P. Chen, M. Mohammad, L.B. Kish, which is submitted to the journal Metrology 
and Measurement Systems in Feb 2016 and is pending review. 
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Note that the temperature compensation method [18] based on the non-
equilibrium thermodynamical aspects of KLJN to eliminate the information leak in a 
wire resistance attack does not reduce the efficiency of the cable capacitance attack. 
Also, note that there is a new, advanced protocol, the random-resistor-random-
temperature (RRRT) KLJN scheme [32], where all the former attacks become invalid or 
incomplete, and currently no known attack works against it. This is also true for the 
cable capacitance attack presented above; it is invalid against the RRRT-KLJN scheme. 
Further studies will be needed to find ways for all the former attack schemes to 
successfully extract information from the RRRT-KLJN system [32] at non-ideal 
conditions where they may leak information. 
In Section 4, we validated the current injection attack against both the ideal and 
the practical KLJN system by utilizing LTSPICE. We have shown that the current and 
voltage comparison method, combined by in-site cable simulations, can efficiently detect 
and eliminate the attack. In the most effective attack scenario when Eve’s success 
probability was 0.613, privacy amplification technique can effectively bring it down to 
0.502 (i.e. Eve can obtain no information). The unconditional security of the practical 
KLJN key exchange system [1] is preserved against this attack, too. 
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